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ABSTRACT 
Despite studies which indicate that mandatory adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) reduced the cost of capital for adopting firms and improved 
analysts’ forecasts, the evidence supporting any improvement in accounting quality is mixed. 
In a European wide country study, we calculate a broadly based measure of earnings 
management defined as accruals which are unrelated to current activity or past-current-future 
cash flows. At the individual country level we find that accounting quality improved only in 
France, Germany and Netherland, which are categories as ‘legal origin countries’. Moreover, 
based on an equity valuation model adjusted for earnings quality, we find that, in most 
European countries, the market overreacted to the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption. 
Further test shows that investors do not seem to understand the exact components of the 
financial statements that IFRS will have impact on.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2005 International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) were mandatory for quoted 
companies within the European Union (EU). This was a major step to promote harmonisation 
within the EU, mirroring the audacious promotion of worldwide standards by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The cost of the development and 
promotion of IFRS was (and still is) significant both for regulators and companies. Of course, 
the harmonisation of standards does not require that all companies improve the quality of 
their financial reporting, but some improvement is to be expected. Therefore an important 
question is whether accounting quality has improved following the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS within the EU. An associated, and equally important, question is whether financial 
markets have responded appropriately. 
Whether accounting quality is improved has been researched in a number of ways. One 
approach is to examine the impact of IFRS adoption on the security market. Measuring 
impact through security price change, the evidence is generally supportive. Another group of 
studies focus on analysts’ forecasts, examining the information environment surrounding the 
formation of prices, for example Horton et al. (2013). Here again, the evidence suggests that 
there is a beneficial effect of mandatory IFRS. 
Other studies take a more direct approach and examine the quality of reporting. Despite 
the superficial attraction of assessing the impact of IFRS through accounting quality, this 
approach has its own problems, namely the measure of accounting quality. Several measures 
have been used; earnings smoothing; loss avoidance; managing towards a target (for 
example, last year’s earnings or the analysts’ consensus forecast). Although accounting 
quality should include such aspects, accounting quality is a broader concept. In response to 
this concern, studies have used the well-established measure of earnings management, as 
measured by discretionary accruals (Jones 1991; Dechow et al. 1995). This method identifies 
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earnings management as accruals which cannot be explained by the firm’s current sales 
activity or by its stock of plant, property and equipments. We follow this approach except 
that we use the McNichols (2002) enhancement which allows the explained accruals to 
include also those accruals which relate to past, current and future cash flows. This 
adjustment makes sense because, for example, accruals may be recognising future losses, 
unrelated to current activity. Furthermore, McNichols demonstrates that the modification 
improves the estimate of discretionary accruals.  
The first contribution we make is that, unlike other studies, we do not aggregate 
observations from different countries. This avoids the need to classify each country according 
to the strength of its enforcement procedures and according to the difference between the 
prior local GAAP and IFRS. We conduct the McNichols (2002) earnings quality test for the 
majority of European countries and find that, indeed, earnings quality improves only in 
France, Germany and Netherland following IFRS adoption in 2005. 
The second contribution we make is that, in addition to investigating whether or 
mandatory IFRS improved accruals quality, we assess the size of the market’s response. In 
order to achieve this, we construct a quality-adjusted measure of earnings, as part of an 
earnings and investment opportunities valuation model similar to that of Modigliani and 
Miller (1961). Given that each observation for earnings is already adjusted for accrual 
quality, there should be no change in the coefficient of ‘accounting quality weighted 
earnings’ before and after mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005. In contrast to this expectation, 
we find that the coefficient on quality-adjusted earnings increases in the post 2005 era, 
suggesting an overreaction to the improvement in earnings quality. We argue that this is not 
surprising given (i) the significant promotion of IFRS undertaken by regulators, (ii) the core 
competence of analysts being outside of accounting, and (iii) the difficulty which individuals 
find in deviating from the group consensus. 
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section outlines the background 
and prior work. The third section describes the contribution, which is followed by the 
research design, the sample selection process and results. The final section is the conclusion.  
II. PRIOR LITERATURE 
 Security Market Impact 
Following the mandatory adoption of IFRS in Europe by quoted companies from 2005, 
an important question, in view of the significant costs involved by both regulators and 
companies, is whether the quality of financial reporting improved as a result. One approach to 
assessing the impact of IFRS is to examine how the security market is affected. Several 
studies have followed this path and generally the findings are positive. For example, 
Armstrong et al. (2010) examine 3-day returns of 3,265 European firms around 16 events in 
the run up to mandatory adoption which affected the likelihood of adoption of IFRS in 
Europe. They find a positive market reaction except in code law countries, which is 
consistent with investors’ concerns over enforcement. Other studies analyse the stock price 
effects of the IFRS disclosures once they are mandatory, such as Daske et al. (2008) and Li 
(2010). Both of these studies find that there is a positive price impact, associated with a 
reduction in the cost of capital, in countries where there is strong legal enforcement. 
A weakness of examining the stock price response is that the evidence captures simply 
the association between (i) shifts in the market’s assessment of securities and (ii) the adoption 
of IFRS. What has changed following IFRS adoption is left ambiguous. The implied change 
is an improvement in accounting quality, but this is not documented. In the light of this 
drawback, other studies have tried to identify an improvement in analysts’ information 
environment following IFRS adoption. If an improvement in forecast accuracy can be found, 
then it is more likely that mandatory IFRS has improved reporting quality. Examples of such 
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studies are Byard et al. (2011) and Horton et al. (2013). They find that analysts’ forecast 
errors are in fact reduced following IFRS adoption, which suggests that mandatory IFRS 
improved financial disclosure. A recent study which specifically takes account of changes in 
enforcement accompanying IFRS adoption is Christensen, Hail, and Leuz, (2013), who 
examine changes liquidity (as measured by bid-ask spreads). They find that increases in 
liquidity (decreases in bid-ask spreads) following mandatory IFRS are largely driven by 
changes in enforcement. However, it is not clear that IFRS should have increased liquidity. 
Kim and Verrecchia (1994) show that informative earnings disclosure may in fact decrease 
liquidity by increasing the information asymmetry between traders and market makers. Such 
a scenario would seem to be even more likely when new measurement methods are being 
used.  
 Accounting Quality Impact 
Other studies take a more obvious approach and tackle the substantive issue directly, 
assessing whether or not accounting quality has improved post IFRS. However, this approach 
is not as effective as it might seem since accounting quality is imprecisely defined. Given the 
importance of earnings to equity valuation, the vast majority of studies define accounting 
quality as earnings quality, but even this limited aspect of accounting quality is difficult to 
capture. A number of approaches have been taken. 
First, since accounting quality is to be found largely in the accruals process, studies 
such as Barth et al. (2008) examine the relative volatility of earnings to cash flows, with low 
volatility being taken as evidence of poor quality (i.e. earnings smoothing). This measure of 
earnings quality is consistent with Ball and Shivakumar (2005) where accruals capture the 
early recognition of losses, and hence earnings are more volatile than cash flows. However, 
the measure assumes that any increase in volatility of earnings relative to cash flows is an 
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aspect of good quality accounting; a strong assumption. Thus the measure may indicate good 
quality when in fact the opposite is true. 
A second measure of accounting quality used is the extent to which companies manage 
earnings towards a positive target, following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997). However, this 
measure is criticised by several papers, since there are other explanations for the results; see 
for example Durtschi and Easton (2009), Beaver et al. (2007), and Ayerset al. (2006).  
Thirdly, in a related vein, other studies such as Ahmed et al. (2013) and Barth et al. 
(2008) examine whether companies following IFRS report losses more frequently than non 
IFRS companies. However, this measure captures only a very minor part of the expected 
improvement from IFRS, which should provide improved information about performance 
well ahead of the company being in a loss making situation. 
A fourth approach to accounting quality is the well-trodden path of estimating earnings 
management through discretionary accruals, based on the cross-sectional version of Jones 
(1991) model. Examples of such studies are Ipino and Parbonetti  (2011) and Jeanjean and 
Stolowy (2008). This measure of quality has promise since it is a well-established and broad 
measure of quality. It is also able to identify different types of earnings management from 
income smoothing to manipulation towards a target. It achieves this by defining discretionary 
accruals as those which cannot be explained by the current activity of the firm, which is 
measured by the change in sales and the level of plant property and equipment.  
Given the variety of research methods used to investigate earnings management under 
IFRS, it is not surprising that the results are mixed. For example: Ahmed et al. (2013) find 
that IFRS firms exhibit significant increases in income smoothing and aggressive reporting of 
accruals, and a significant decrease in timeliness of loss recognition; Jeanjean and Stolowy 
(2008) find that earnings management has not declined; and Barth et al. (2008), albeit 
focussing on voluntary adoption, find an improvement in accounting quality. These varied 
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findings contrast with the unambiguous results from the stock price impact and the analyst 
forecast studies which suggest an improvement in accounting quality following mandatory 
IFRS adoption for countries which enforce the standards.  
III.  CONTRIBUTION 
Disaggregated Analysis 
The first contribution of the paper is to provide a country-by-country analysis. Other 
studies typically provide their results for all the countries investigated, with some adjustment 
for the institutional differences between countries, specifically: (i) the difference between 
IFRS and domestic GAAP prior to IFRS, and (ii) the extent to which regulation is enforced. 
However, accounting for these other factors is problematic. There are weaknesses in 
capturing differences between IFRS and domestic GAAP; see for example Nobes (2009). The 
measures used are an aggregate of differences over a large number of areas, and apart from 
the equal weighting given to each area, the differences are often unsigned, i.e. do not capture 
whether domestic GAAP is worse or better than IFRS. 
The enforcement, or rule of law indices are typically based on perceptions. These, of 
course, suffer from the potential problem of inter country differences in perceptions, since 
perceptions are likely to be framed by local conditions. This has led some researchers to 
regard such indices as fatally flawed (Kurtz and Schrank 2007). In addition, the rules of law 
indices are not specific enough to accounting (Preiato et al. 2012). 
A further disadvantage of the investigating countries aggregated together is that it is not 
clear whether the results obtained are to be found throughout the sample or whether they are 
driven by just a few countries. This distinction is clearly important from a policy viewpoint. 
The Magnitude of the Security Market Impact 
Secondly, and probably more important, new feature of the paper is that, in addition to 
investigating whether mandatory IFRS improved accounting quality, we evaluate the size of 
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the market’s response. It is important to investigate this issue, since there are three 
institutional features which may have led to an overreaction to IFRS. Firstly, since its 
inception in 1973 the International Accounting Standards Committee and subsequently the 
IASB has achieved remarkable success in its promotion of a single worldwide set of 
accounting standards to facilitate and encourage the global economy (Ball 2006). This 
achievement has involved much promotion, debate and argument over a long period of time. 
Indeed, Young (2003) in discussing the work of the Financial Accounting Standards Board in 
the USA, argues that accounting standards themselves are an exercise in persuasion through 
the rhetorical devices which are used to present their conclusions as a rational, sensitive and 
practical response to business conditions. Arguments with which the IASB has had to battle 
include Goeltz (1991) who claims that international standards are not necessary because the 
global economy has succeeded quite well without them. More recently Ball et al. (2003) and 
Ball (2006) argue that enforcement matters as much as standards in achieving high quality 
reporting. Therefore the benefits claimed by the IASB for achieving a universal business 
language are perhaps premature. The limitations to harmonisation between countries, despite 
their adoption of IFRS, are well documented in Kvaal and Nobes (2012), Nobes (2011), Zeff 
and Nobes (2010), and Nobes (2006). The achievements of IFRS are limited because of 
different versions, translations, and interpretations of IFRS as well as the gaps and choices in 
the standards. Hence, the well-known difference between Anglo Saxon and Continental 
European countries is still evident even in 2009. 
Consequently, in their promotional success the IASB may have allowed an illusion to 
be created, that IFRS will give rise to a greater improvement than is achievable. An important 
issue, therefore, is not only whether investors have reacted to the improvement in accounting 
quality, but whether their reaction is of the correct magnitude.  
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A second reason why an inappropriate adjustment of share prices to mandatory IFRS is 
possible, even likely, is that financial statement analysis is not the core competence of 
professional investors. Barker (2000) reports that they are mostly concerned with 
understanding the performance of the company from an economic perspective. Goeltz (1991) 
and Bouwman et al. (1987) make clear that the foremost concern when making investment 
decisions is not the quality of accounting standards. It is unnecessary to have accounting 
measurements on exactly the same basis since broad brush adjustments are enough. 
Therefore, professional investors are likely to take on trust the benefits which are said to 
come from a common, and improved, set of global accounting standards.  
Thirdly, research in behavioural finance suggests that it is difficult for individuals to 
deviate from the group consensus (Janis 1982; Shiller 2001). This is especially true when 
judgments are complex and feedback is limited, as in the case of the benefits of accounting 
standards. In addition, Lo (2004) in the discussion of the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis, 
argues that investors find it difficult to adapt to a changing environment since the heuristics 
which have worked in the past are no longer suitable. Obeisance to conventional wisdom is 
strong. 
For these three reasons, (i) the persuasion undertaken by IASB, (ii) the core 
competence of market agents being outside of accounting, and (iii) the behavioural difficulty 
of escaping the group consensus, we address the issue of overreaction to the achieved 
improvement in accounting quality following mandatory IFRS. 
 
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The main thrust of our research design is to construct an equity valuation model which 
includes accounting quality. Since the model already captures accounting quality, the model 
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coefficient should not shift between pre and post IFRS periods. Any observed shift is then an 
indication of overreaction or under reaction. 
Accounting Quality 
Our measure of accounting quality is based on the extension of Dechow and Dichev's 
model (Dechow and Dichev 2002) suggested by McNichols (2002). A potential problem with 
measuring earnings management based on the residuals from the cross-sectional Jones (1991) 
model, is that some residuals may be informative about future cash flows rather than the 
product of manipulation. For example, accruals which are an early recognition of future 
losses are treated as earnings management unless they are correlated with either the change in 
revenue and or with plant property and equipment (the explanatory variables in the Jones 
model). 
McNichols (2002) deals with this by using the relation between accruals and cash flows 
developed by Dechow and Dichev (2002) to purge the Jones (1991) model residuals of these 
informative deviations. We estimate the residual from the extended Jones (1991) model by 
McNicols (2002) as follows : 
                                                                            (1) 
where:        is total accruals;        is cash flows from operation;         is change in sales; 
and        is plant property and equipment, for company j at year t, respectively.
1
 Our 
measure of accounting quality       is then defined as: 
        |    |                                       (2) 
where      is the residual estimated from Equation (1) above.   
The absolute value of the residual is taken so that accounting quality is the same for 
both negative and positive residuals, and is deducted from one so that smaller residuals are 
                                                          
1
 The exact definitions of all the variables are contained in the Appendix. 
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associated with greater accounting quality than larger residuals.
2
 The measurement of 
earnings quality by a single number is consistent with observed practice amongst chief 
finance officers and standard setters (Dichev, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2013). 
The valuation model 
The first component of the valuation model is earnings which is almost the universal 
approach to valuation in practice; see for example Govindarajan (1980), Arnold and Moizer 
(1984), Barker (1999b) and Demirakos et al. (2004). There is also empirical support for this 
emphasis on earnings from Dechow et al. (1999) who find that the model which has the 
smallest forecast error in explaining security prices is the earnings capitalisation model.
3
 
However, Barker (1999a) in his interviews with professional investors finds that they do not 
take earnings at the face value and make adjustments based on their assessment of 
management. The rationale is that the management of the company will have a strong 
influence on future performance; and since the management is observable it can be evaluated. 
In the spirit of this adjustment, we multiply reported earnings with our estimate of earnings 
quality, to give a quality adjusted measure of performance, weighted earnings. 
In our model, the coefficient on weighted earnings is affected by the general conditions 
in the economy, as reflected in the change in gross national product.  The basis for this is that 
investors are buying not just this year’s earnings but a stream of earnings. It is difficult for 
any company to avoid the general macroeconomic environment in which it operates and the 
therefore the state of the economy will affect the importance placed on the current weighted 
earnings. 
As well as single period earnings, Demirakos et al. (2004) find that multi-period factors 
also play a part in valuation in industries such as pharmaceuticals. This arises from the 
                                                          
2
 Obviously, a problem arises if the absolute value of a residual exceeds one, since accounting quality for that 
observation would then be negative. However, in the McNichols accruals model, the dependent variable 
(accruals) is scaled by assets and therefore a negative AQ measure is unlikely. Based on the whole sample the 
residuals are: mean=0.041; standard deviation=0.035; min=0.000; max=0.367. 
3
 This is the model in Dechow et al. 1999, (Table 5, Panel B) where ω=1 and γ=0 (identical to ω=0 and γ=1). 
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importance of research and development and other firm specific actions which may be taken 
to improve the position of the company. In order to reflect this aspect of valuation we include 
a capital investment variable in addition to earnings. We also include a book value variable to 
capture the ability of the company to adapt to changes in the economic environment, as 
suggested by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997 and Ashton, Cooke and Tippett (2003). When 
these components of valuation are included, our valuation equation has a similar structure to 
the classical Modigliani and Miller (1961) investment opportunities approach to valuation, 
and also to that suggested by Shen and Stark, 2013.  
In order to capture the potential effect of mandatory IFRS, we include a dummy 
variable which may affect the coefficient on weighted earnings and book value. The valuation 
model is given in equation 3. 
               
                                                 
                         (3) 
where:       is market value, defined as market value scaled by total asset at the end of fiscal 
year t.       is total assets;        is weighted earnings, defined as earnings multiplied by 
accounting quality;
 
         is the change in gross national product;      is a dummy variable 
taking a value of 1 if a firm adopts IFRS from 2005 and 0 otherwise;       is book value 
scaled by total asset at the end of fiscal year t; and       is a proxy for excess returns on 
investment scaled by total asset at the end of fiscal year t. 
Notable aspects of the model are as follows. The theory of the valuation equation does 
not require that the variables are scaled by total assets. In our model scaling is applied to all 
variables to reduce heteroscedasticity, and hence is also applied to the original constant term 
β0. We have argued that, for valuation purposes, weighted earnings needs to be viewed in the 
context of macroeconomic factors, and therefore it is unlikely that the coefficient β1 will be 
significant. Many IFRS rules are ‘fair-value’ oriented and therefore favor the balance sheet. 
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The corresponding changes would have been reflected both in Balance Sheet and in 
Comprehensive Income Statement rather than ‘net income’. Therefore the variable book 
value would be able to capture the improvement in accounting quality that comes through the 
Balance Sheet. The coefficient β5.captures the potential increased emphasis given to the book 
value of assets under IFRS which places importance on the fair value of assets. Since the 
weighted earnings variable is already adjusted for the quality of its accruals, the impact of 
mandatory IFRS is already captured; therefore, the coefficient β3 measures the underreaction 
(β3<0) or overreaction (β3>0) to IFRS. This specification follows the suggestion of Rabin 
(2013), that psychological assumptions should be specified as alternative parameter values, 
along with the same independent variables as existing research. The excess returns from the 
new investment variable,       is not adjusted for accounting quality since our quality 
measure is based on accruals which are unlikely to affect investment. 
 
V. SAMPLE 
Selection Criteria  
Firm valuation, earnings quality measures, and other firm-level variables (including 
market to book value, earnings, cash flows from operation, capital expenditure, accounting 
standards that companies follow)  are based on accounting and finance data of 8 EU countries 
(UK, France, Germany, Sweden, Netherland, Denmark, Switzerland and Spain) from 1993 to 
2010 and obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The Appendix lists the definition of 
all the raw variables used in this paper. In order to be included for analysis, companies need 
to have at least 8 years data.
4
 To mitigate the influence of outliers, all firm-level continuous 
variables are winsorised at the top and bottom 1 percent of their distributions, and 
                                                          
4
 Due to the selection criteria, there are no observations for Spain left for analysis. 
Page 15 of 30 
 
observations with market to book value greater than 3 and lower than -3 are omitted. The 
final sample consist 9760 firm-year observations from 7 EU countries. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table1 provides country-level sample descriptive statistics for the variables 
used in the tests. We can see that the numbers of observations vary widely across sample 
countries, with the UK having the largest firm-year observations (3319) and Denmark having 
the smallest (670). Compared with the extant literature (e.g. Li 2010; Barth et al 2008), our 
sample size is larger, and therefore, be able to account for most of the listed companies in the 
EU.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 also shows that the average market values scaled by total assets have a 
substantial degree of variation, ranging from 0.0005 (France) to 20.1425 (UK). In addition, 
the country-level average accruals scaled by total assets are all negative, ranging from -
0.7047 (UK) to -1.8270 (UK), and average cash flows from operation scaled by total assets 
varies from -1.1644 (UK) to 0.7490 (UK). The reason that the data of the UK has a large 
variation is due to the fact that the UK has the largest sample size, with most of the listed 
companies being included, regardless of size. 
Pearson correlations coefficients between all variables used in the regression models 
have been reported in Panel B of Table 1. Panel B shows a correlation between market value 
and weighted earnings with a correlation coefficient of 0.31 (p-value <0.001). This finding 
suggests that the market value captures common information in accounting quality-adjusted 
earnings. The results also show a positive relationship between the excess return on capital 
investment and market value, suggesting that the market does value the capital investment by 
firms. Besides, accruals has a negative correlation coefficient of -0.49 (p<0.001) with current 
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cash flows from operation. These results are consistent with Dechow and Dichev (2002), 
McNichols (2002) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005).  
VI. RESULTS 
Has Accounting Quality Improved? 
Panel A of Table 2 lists the descriptive statistics of accounting quality for each 
individual country. The average accounting quality of Germany and Denmark are relatively 
poor when compared with other countries in the EU. However, an interesting finding is that 
the UK has the biggest standard deviation of accounting quality, with the minimum figure of 
accounting quality as 0.0576 (while for other countries, this figure in average is about 
0.7000) and the maximum value as 0.9999. Given that the number of observations is the 
largest of the UK (and includes most listed companies) it is not surprising that there is 
substantial variation of accruals quality across firms.  
We then estimate the following regression to exam whether accounting quality has 
improved after the mandatory switch to IFRS:  
                        (4) 
Panel B of Table 2 shows the impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on accounting 
quality defined by Equation (1) and (2), as measured by the coefficient  . A positive   
implies that accrual quality has improved after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005. The 
results for the whole sample indicate a positively significant coefficient of 0.0031 with t-
statistics of 4.00, suggesting that overall the average accrual quality has improved following 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Our results are consistent with the results of Chen, et al. 
(2010) and Zeghal, et al. (2012), which find that accounting quality has improved at the 
aggregate level of 15 EU countries.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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However, in contrast, our results at the individual country level indicate that accruals 
quality has improved only for a few countries. Our results therefore question the conclusions 
of other studies that earnings quality consistently improves following IFRS adoption in 2005. 
As mentioned, prior studies with a pooled sample are unable to capture differences between 
countries. Our country-by-country analysis indicates that accounting quality has not 
improved in most of the European countries, and therefore the conclusions of prior studies 
with a pooled sample need to be treated with caution.  
The countries where mandatory IFRS has improved accruals quality are France, 
Germany, and The Netherlands. France, Germany and UK are usually classified as ‘legal 
origin countries’, where the shareholder protection has been constantly improved in the last 
two centuries (Siems 2007).  With strong law enforcement to protect shareholders' interest, it 
is not surprising that accounting quality will be improved in France and Germany after IFRS 
adoption. It is interesting to notice that our results show that the accounting quality in the UK 
has not improved. This is reasonable, since there is only a limited difference between the UK 
GAAP and IFRS. Other European countries are 'transplant countries', which copied the law of 
one of the origin countries at one point in time. It might take time for shareholders protection 
to be effective. Our results provide support to this argument and suggest that accounting 
quality in other countries other than Germany, France (except the Netherland) has not yet 
improved.  
Overreaction or Underreaction? 
Table 3 presents the empirical results of multivariate regression analysis of Equation 
3. Coefficients of each parameter are reported. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm and year 
clustering are reported in parentheses.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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Firstly, as discussed, in the model we include three variables that are related to 
earnings: weighted earnings, which is defined as earnings multiplies by accounting quality; 
the weighted earnings multiplied by the changes in GDP, and weighted earnings interacted by 
mandatory adoption dummy variable of IFRS.  We have discussed that when proxy interacted 
by macroeconomics factor is included, it is not surprising that the coefficients of weighted 
earnings (β1) is not statistically significant; while on the contrary the coefficient    should be 
statistically significant as when weighted earnings is interacted by macroeconomics factor, it 
captures the weights that the investors put on a stream of weighted earnings. Our results of 
individual countries generally reflect the proposition. Out of the seven countries, coefficients 
   are statistically significant at 1 percent level for samples of France, Sweden, the UK, 
Netherland and Switzerland. This implies that investors from these five countries put weight 
on the weighted earnings interacted by change of GDP. In other words, when investors from 
these five countries value equities in the market, they focus on not only the current earnings, 
but also a stream of earnings including future earnings, and they would expect that the future 
earnings that companies can make are dependent on the macroeconomics condition. For 
sample of Germany and Denmark, coefficients    are statistically significant rather than 
coefficients   , which implies that investors from these two countries, on the contrary, only 
put weight on current weighted earnings.  
Our results indicate that investors seem to value either series of accounting quality 
adjusted earnings or just current accounting quality adjusted earnings, and the impact of 
accounting quality is significant on firm value. This finding is consistent with Gaio and 
Raposo (2011), who also found aggregate earnings quality has significant impact on firm 
value.  
Secondly, the coefficients of the weighted earnings interacted by mandatory adoption 
dummy variable of IFRS are positive and statistically significant for all countries. The impact 
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of IFRS on the accounting quality has been incorporated into the measure of weighted 
earnings. Therefore, if investors react rationally to the mandatory adoption of IFRS, the 
coefficient of the interacted weighted earnings would be expected to be insignificant. Our 
results of positively significant coefficient indicate that investors overweigh the impact of the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS on the market value. This finding of overreaction combined with 
the evidence that accounting quality has improved in only three countries out of our eight 
sample countries addresses an issue of overreaction to the impact of mandatory IFRS 
adoption in accounting quality. As mentioned above, this situation may arise since (i) there is 
significant promotion of IFRS by domestic regulators and the IASB, (ii) accounting expertise 
is not the core concern for security investment decisions and (ii) short-termism makes it 
difficult to deviate markedly from the market consensus.  
Thirdly, book value has been adjusted in our model to capture the possible changes due 
to IFRS ‘marked-to-market’ orientation and has not been reflected in ‘net income’. The item 
interacted by dummy variable of IFRS adoption will be able to capture the potential increased 
emphasis given to the book value after adoption of IFRS. For both whole sample and 
individual country sample, all the coefficients    are statistically significant at 1 percent 
level, which suggests that investors from our sample countries do consider book value when 
they value a firm. Coefficient    is only statistically significant for sample of Denmark. It is 
0.21 and significant at 1 percent level, implying that investors from Denmark put extra 
weight on the book value after the adoption of IFRS. They might think the book value after 
mandatory adoption of IFRS carries more information than before.  
Lastly, 7 out of 9 coefficients for excess returns on capital investment are statistically 
positive across countries. We believe that this variable is able to reflect the impact of 
expended capital investment on the market value. Our evidence suggests that market value of 
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a company increases with the marginal increase of the profit obtained from further capital 
investment.  
It might be argued that improvements in the comparability of financial statements 
arising from the adoption of IFRS is a potential explanation for our overreaction findings. If 
companies in one country are more comparable as a result of IFRS, then omitting this 
variable may give the impression of overreaction. This is unlikely to be the case. First, the 
paper by DeFranco, Kothari, and Verdi (2011) assumes that comparability is not a component 
of valuation; the measure of comparability is based on how well earnings maps in to the stock 
return, which is assumed to capture the impact of all the economic events affecting the 
company. Secondly, the evidence presented by Yip and Young (2012, Table 4 Panel B) 
shows that comparability effects are very small, and that if anything IFRS has reduced 
comparability across national frontiers. 
 
VII. ROBUSTNESS TEST 
Decomposition of Earnings into Cash Flows from Operation and Accruals 
In order to further investigate the source of the overreaction to earnings, we decompose 
the earnings into two components: cash flows from operations and accruals. When earnings 
are replaced by these two components, Equation 3 can be re-written as follows: 
               
                                                                      
                                     (5) 
where:        is cash flows from operation;        is weighted accruals, defined as accruals 
multiplied by accounting quality. As accruals are adjusted by accounting quality,
 5
 the impact 
of IFRS should have been incorporated in to WACC. If investor responds rationally to the 
mandatory adoption, the coefficient    should not be significant. A significantly positive 
                                                          
5
 Cash flows from operation should not be affected by IFRS. Here we assume that investors are aware the 
difference between cash flows and accruals. Therefore when earnings are decomposed into two components, 
only accruals are adjusted by the proxy for accounting quality. 
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coefficient indicates overreaction, whereas a significantly negative coefficient indicates 
underreaction. 
Table 4 presents the estimation results of Equation 5. Firstly, our results indicate that all 
coefficients of both cash flows from operation    are all statistically positive and significant 
of all the individual countries. This suggests that when valuation by investor is based on a 
stream of cash flows, and the stream of cash flows are affected by macroeconomics status. 
Our findings provide support for investment opportunities approach to valuation by 
Modigliani and Miller(1961).  Moreover we have found the same results as we based on 
earnings as a whole that investors from Germany and Denmark put more weights on current 
cash flows.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Our results also show that for the whole sample, the coefficient on the mandatory 
adoption dummy interacted with CFO (δ3) is 1.28, and the coefficient on the mandatory 
adoption dummy interacted with WACC (δ5) is 0.76. The evidence of statistically significant 
and positive    coefficient and    coefficient suggest that in general investors in the 
European market overreact to the impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS both on the quality 
of cash flows from operation and the quality of accruals.  
When examining the overreaction in each individual country, we find that investors in 
Germany, Sweden, the UK, Denmark and Switzerland overreact to the accounting quality 
adjusted accruals, cash flows from operation or book value. This evidence shows that 
investors are less able to understand the impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS. The don’t 
know the improvement that IFRS could make is reflected in accruals, cash flows or in other 
forms like book value. Our results are consistent with Xie (2001), who also reports that 
investors mis-evaluate the components of earnings.  
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Our investigation of accounting quality based on McNichols' model (McNichols 2002) 
suggests that accounting quality with pooled sample of the eight EU countries has improved 
after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005. However, examination of each individual 
country shows that accounting quality has been improved only in France, Germany and the 
Netherland. The evidence questions the existing conclusion that accounting quality has been 
improved generally, and addresses the issue of prior studies' application of pooled sample 
data.  
The estimation results of earnings and investment opportunity valuation model with 
accounting quality adjusted earnings suggest that market recognises the possible impact of 
mandatory adoption of IFRS on accounting quality, but investors actually overreact to the 
improvement. Given the fact that regulator has significantly promoted IFRS, with 'following 
the crowd' psycho, investors over-weigh the accounting improvement during valuation 
process.  
When earnings are decomposed into earnings components as cash flows from operation 
and accruals, our results suggest that investors are less able to understand the way that 
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Change of working capital of firm j in year t at the end of fiscal year scaled by 
total assets at the end of fiscal year t 
The ratio of capital expenditure of firm j in year t scaled by total assets at the end 
of fiscal year t 
Cash flows from operations of firm j in year t scaled by total assets at the end of 
fiscal year t 
Net operating income of firm j in year t scaled by total assets at the end of fiscal 
year t 
Excess return on investment at the end of fiscal year t scaled by total assets at the 
end of fiscal year t, defined as: CAPEXj,t*[(MTBVj,t-IRj,t)/IRj,t] 
3-month T-bill rate at the end of fiscal year t 
Mandatory adoption dummy, which takes the value of 1 if a firm adopts IFRS 
from 2005, and 0 otherwise 













Market value of firm j in year t scaled by total assets at the end of fiscal year t  
Book value of firm j in year t scaled by total assets at the end of fiscal year t 
Gross value of property, plant and equipment of firm j in year t scaled by total 
assets at the end of fiscal year t 
Change in total sales of firm j between year t-1 and t scaled by total assets at the 
end of fiscal year t 
Total assets of firm j at the end of fiscal year t 
Weighted accruals, defined as the product of ACCj,t and AQj,t 
Weighted operation cash flows, defined as the product of CFOj,t and AQj,t 
Weighted earnings, defined as the product of Earningsj,t and AQj,t 
GDP growth of country i of fiscal year t 
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TABLES 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Coloration Matrix 
Panel A Descriptive Statistics 
  MV BV Earnings CFO ACC CAPEX EX 
All Mean 0.6512 0.4376 0.0627 0.0839 -0.0212 0.0565 0.0003 
Obs. 9760 S.D 0.5115 0.2753 0.0812 0.0819 0.0795 0.0579 0.0006 
 Min 0.0005 -3.1259 -1.3057 -1.1644 -0.7047 -0.0218 -0.0028 
 Max 20.1425 7.1466 1.0435 0.7490 1.8270 1.7450 0.0295 
France Mean 0.5744 0.3877 0.0583 0.0799 -0.0216 0.0486 0.0003 
Obs. 1747 S.D 0.3749 0.1653 0.0594 0.0644 0.0695 0.0399 0.0005 
 Min 0.0005 -0.3503 -0.1810 -0.2435 -0.4982 0.0005 -0.0005 
 Max 2.6738 0.9168 0.4356 0.5566 0.3311 0.3576 0.0108 
Germany Mean 0.5268 0.3518 0.0422 0.0828 -0.0406 0.0612 0.0003 
Obs. 1784 S.D 0.3931 0.1949 0.0840 0.0776 0.0821 0.0530 0.0003 
 Min 0.0055 -0.7278 -0.5445 -0.3532 -0.5547 0.0007 -0.0003 
 Max 3.0846 1.6326 0.4691 0.4971 0.3380 0.6094 0.0049 
Sweden Mean 0.6681 0.4203 0.0666 0.0859 -0.0193 0.0541 0.0003 
Obs. 735 S.D 0.4497 0.2409 0.090 0.0907 0.0729 0.0578 0.0004 
 Min 0.0067 0.0066 -0.4321 -0.5705 -0.4114 -0.0218 -0.0002 
 Max 2.8274 2.9959 0.5758 0.5260 0.4697 0.9195 0.0070 
UK Mean 0.8165 0.5281 0.0803 0.0874 -0.0071 0.0567 0.0002 
Obs. 3319 S.D 0.6688 0.3565 0.0968 0.0990 0.0921 0.0604 0.0003 
 Min 0.0345 -3.1259 -1.3057 -1.1644 -0.7047 0.0001 -0.0028 
 Max 20.1425 6.8515 1.0435 0.7490 1.8270 0.5948 0.0057 
Netherland Mean 0.6628 0.4292 0.0821 0.0988 -0.0166 0.0657 0.0003 
Obs. 629 S.D 0.3546 0.1633 0.0543 0.0725 0.0739 0.0606 0.0004 
 Min 0.0510 0.0321 -0.1508 -0.2042 -0.3446 0.0039 0.0000 
 Max 2.0374 1.2281 0.2949 0.4397 0.3110 0.7309 0.0055 
Denmark Mean 0.5430 0.4222 0.0550 0.0769 -0.0220 0.0733 0.0003 
Obs. 670 S.D 0.3881 0.2109 0.0667 0.0736 0.0666 0.0842 0.0004 
 Min 0.0231 -0.0835 -0.2063 -0.2778 -0.3375 0.0009 -0.0000 
 Max 3.060 2.3154 0.5281 0.5207 0.2915 0.9480 0.0045 
Switzerland Mean 0.5676 0.4117 0.0508 0.0825 -0.0317 0.0451 0.0008 
Obs. 877 S.D 0.3611 0.1815 0.0543 0.0542 0.0554 0.0332 0.0016 
 Min 0.0430 -0.1871 -0.1868 -0.0902 -0.3405 0.0009 -0.0003 
 Max 2.5562 1.2708 0.2509 0.3330 0.2159 0.3195 0.0295 
 
 
Panel B Pearson Correlation 
 MV EARNINGS CFO ACC EX BV 
MV 1      
EARNINGS 0.31*** 1     
CFO 0.16*** 0.53*** 1    
ACC 0.15** 0.48*** -0.49*** 1   
EX 0.14*** 0.08*** 0.16*** -0.08*** 1  
BV 0.61*** 0.19*** 0.08*** 0.12*** 0.02 1 
 
Panel A shows descriptive statistics of variables used in the paper. All variables are defined in Appendix. Whole 
sample includes 10,333 observations with 1175 firms. Figures for 8 individual countries are also reported. S.D is 
standard deviation. Pearson correlations between variables have been reported in panel B. *, **, and *** denote 
significance of coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively, using a two tailed test.  
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Table 2 The Impact of Mandatory Adoption of IFRS on Accounting Quality 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Accounting Quality  
 All France Germany Sweden UK Netherland Denmark Switzerland 
Mean 0.9621 0.9630 0.9511 0.9644 0.9688 0.9627 0.9606 0.9657 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.0382 0.0347 0.0378 0.0320 0.0412 0.0355 0.0345 0.0257 
Min 0.0576 0.6661 0.6407 0.7012 0.0576 0.7386 0.7142 0.8036 
Max 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 
Number of 
Observation 
9760 1747 1784 735 3319 629 121 670 
 
Panel B: The Impact of Mandatory Adoption of IFRS on Accounting Quality 
                                                                                                              (4) 
 All France Germany Sweden UK Netherland Denmark Switzerland 


















9760 1747 1784 735 3319 629 121 670 
 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of accounting quality, which is defined by equation 1 and 2: 
                                                                                              (1) 
        |    |                                                                                                                                       (2) 
All variables are defined in Appendix. 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the results of equation 4. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
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Table 3 Market Value and Accounting Quality-Adjusted Earnings  
 
               
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
   All France Germany Sweden UK Netherland Denmark Switzerland 
     Coefficient     1786.53 3675.32 2276.93 -5518.04 1633.61 904.10 2732.03 -15245.94 
   (2.91***) (3.48***) (1.15) (-0.73) (2.28**) (0.64) (0.19) (-1.79*) 
WE Coefficient     0.61 -0.03 0.36 -0.09 0.27 0.38 0.67 0.28 
   (4.03***) (-0.13) (2.13**) (-0.26) (0.97) (1.16) (2.57***) (0.71) 
WE*MD Coefficient     1.25 0.66 0.87 1.09 1.73 1.04 0.81 1.00 
   (4.46***) (1.98**) (4.67***) (1.81**) (4.95***) (2.11**) (1.73*) (2.61***) 
WE*GDP Coefficient    0.29 0.44 0.06 0.24 0.45 0.45 0.15 0.38 
   (11.80***) (6.95***) (1.60) (5.36***) (8.45***) (9.95***) (1.81*) (5.49***) 
BV Coefficient    0.79 0.99 0.96 0.86 0.83 1.02 0.64 0.94 
   (8.06***) (7.54***) (7.09***) (4.64***) (7.42***) (7.77***) (6.21***) (6.43***) 
BV*MD Coefficient    -0.09 0.02 -0.02 -0.15 -0.11 0.06 0.21 -0.04 
   (-1.29) (0.35) (-0.34) (-1.06) (-1.63) (0.54) (2.80***) (-0.45) 
EX Coefficient    73.50 56.56 240.04 236.23 425.32 127.30 206.99 14.95 
   (3.36***) (1.93*) (5.39***) (5.16***) (6.63***) (1.47) (4.26***) (2.11**) 
constant    0.17 0.08 0.06 0.21 0.11 0.02 0.13 0.15 
   (4.02***) (1.71*) (1.62) (3.04***) (1.95*) (0.40) (3.91***) (3.05***) 
No. of observations   9760 1747 1784 735 3319 629 670 877 
No. of firms   1175 205 199 85 397 71 64 92 
R
2
   45.41 45.51 61.43 53.12 40.73 54.12 53.07 49.61 
Table 3 shows estimation results of equation 3. All variables are defined in Appendix. The sample comprises firm-year observations of 8 countries in the EU between 1993 
and 2011. We base the analysis on industry fixed firm and year effect regression. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance of coefficients at the 
10 %, 5% and 1% level respectively, using a two tailed test.
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Table 4 Market Value and Accounting Quality-Adjusted Earnings Components 
               
                                                                                           




Table 4 shows estimation results of equation 5. All variables are defined in Appendix. The sample comprises firm-year observations of 8 countries in the EU between 1993 
and 2011. We base the analysis on industry fixed firm and year effect regression. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance of coefficients at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively, using a two tailed test.  
  All France Germany Sweden UK Netherland Denmark Switzerland 
     Coefficient    2161.29 3146.16 1981.84 -4435.76 1984.77 984.26 724.60 -14805.45 
  (3.69***) (3.27***) (1.10) (-0.51) (3.08***) (0.59) (0.05) (-1.71*) 
CFO Coefficient    0.43 -0.27 0.44 -0.11 0.08 0.44 0.49 0.30 
  (1.92*) (-1.24) (2.73***) (-0.35) (0.21) (1.26) (2.30**) (0.84) 
CFO*GDP Coefficient    0.21 0.44 0.05 0.21 0.34 0.29 0.11 0.23 
  (12.83***) (10.86***) (2.29**) (5.66***) (6.41***) (8.56***) (1.75*) (4.74***) 
CFO*MD Coefficient    1.28 0.34 0.70 0.80 1.64 0.82 0.35 1.34 
  (3.39***) (0.96) (3.46***) (1.24) (3.44***) (1.45) (0.77) (3.39***) 
WACC Coefficient    1.22 0.65 0.42 0.33 1.59 1.52 0.97 0.90 
  (5.71***) (2.94***) (2.40**) (1.09) (4.53***) (4.15***) (4.54***) (2.22**) 
WACC*MD Coefficient    0.76 0.20 0.86 1.25 0.91 0.63 0.41 0.49 
  (3.37***) (0.72) (4.22***) (2.46**) (2.24**) (1.13) (0.88) (1.17) 
BV Coefficient    0.82 1.02 0.94 0.81 0.86 1.03 0.64 0.97 
  (8.77***) (7.82***) (7.28***) (4.33***) (7.74***) (7.45***) (6.01***) (6.55***) 
BV*MD Coefficient    -0.11 0.09 0.02 -0.06 -0.14 0.10 0.28 -0.11            
  (-1.31) (1.22) (0.31) (-0.42) (-1.51 (0.73) (3.22***) (-1.16) 
EX Coefficient    73.82 77.87 233.20 255.88 422.48 137.55 215.69 13.49 
  (3.37***) (2.36**) (5.33***) (5.96***) (6.18***) (1.61) (4.58***) (2.02**) 
Constant   0.18 0.09 0.06 0.23 0.13 0.05 0.15 0.16 
  (4.40***) (1.77*) (1.68*) (3.27***) (2.05**) (0.89) (3.88***) (3.35***) 
No. of observations  9760 1747 1784 735 3319 629 670 877 
No. of firms  1175 205 199 85 397 71 64 92 
R
2
  44.62 46.51 61.80 53.16 39.53 55.02 52.52 49.08 
